This article argues that, since the early 1980s, there have been two regimes in Turkey. The first, which is broadly akin to Michael Mann's characterization of Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation, has predominated in areas of the country not administered through emergency legislation. In keeping with his model, it has been most fully asserted in areas of key economic value — particularly the Marmara region and the environs of the capital, Ankara. In the thirteen predominantly Kurdish provinces of the south-east of the country, on the other hand, a second of Mann's regime types, Autocratic Militarism, is discernible. This was institutionalized under a new constitutional structure introduced following the 1980 coup as a means of dealing with a rise in pro-Kurdish insurgency.

INTRODUCTION

Turkey is at a crossroads. The collapse of pro-Kurdish terrorism, the prospect of accession to the European Union and the landslide election victory of a highly reformist government have, over the last four years, brought the nature of Ankara’s administration sharply into focus. Yet there is a surprising absence of studies analysing the structure of the Turkish state. Few have adopted an explicitly theoretical method and none has explored the duality of the current regime. This article uses the work of Michael Mann as a vantage point from which to analyse the political system which has emerged in Turkey since the early 1980s. It firstly sets out the model of social power devised in Volume One of his The Sources of Social Power (Mann, 1986) and reaffirmed in his more recent publications, Incoherent Empire (Mann, 2003) and Fascists (Mann, 2004). Here, the authority and organizational capacity of the state is structured by irreducible networks of political, ideological, military and economic power. Secondly, it deploys Mann’s conceptualization of two militarized regime types — semi-authoritarian...
incorporation and autocratic militarism — which he puts forward in Volume Two of The Sources of Social Power (Mann, 1993). These emerged in Europe around the turn of the twentieth century as contrasting regime responses to a widespread rise in popular political pressures. This article aims to explore the way these two regime types have emerged in Turkey since the early 1980s. Having discussed Mann’s rubric in more detail, it will explore Turkey’s bifurcated regime using his analysis of state power.

MICHAEL MANN’S REGIME TYPOLOGY

Mann defines a regime as ‘an alliance of dominant ideological, economic and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state’ (1993: 18). Those with the greatest organizational control over these command networks (the ‘rulers’ in other words) seek to perpetuate their elite position in two ways. Firstly, by collectively joining with other actors, they can extend their infrastructural reach into the territory over which sovereignty is claimed. Secondly, by distributively organizing power without reference to others, they aim to assert a despotic authority over the ruled (Mann, 1984: 188–9). It is thus the combined levels of relative autonomy in defining goals and co-operation with non-state actors in penetrating civil society and implementing decisions which underpin the types of regime identified by Mann. In fact, all states, he concludes, simultaneously seek to incorporate in order to impose their administrative infrastructures, and coerce in order to increase their despotic autonomy.

Within Mann’s encyclopaedic account of state development, there are two regime types — semi-authoritarian incorporation and autocratic militarism — in which military elites remain politically active. The former appeared as a way of perpetuating social stratification during industrialization. As capitalist class and political elite interests conflated around the shared need for a pacified, tax-paying mass of workers, there emerged a pragmatic approach to dealing with civil resistance in many European states. In response to the growth of labour organization during the nineteenth century, many regimes adopted partially conciliatory strategies. Propertied, skilled workers were frequently enfranchised, empowering moderate political movements at the expense of more radical interests. As Mann puts it, ‘once some workers receive some benefits this way, they are less likely to rally behind revolutionaries. Class unity is broken and the spectre of revolution recedes’ (1993: 600). Such selective repression often necessitated the careful construction of ‘in’, ‘out’ and ‘excluded’ groups by state elites (ibid.: 320). The former broadly consisted of statist conservatives, the urban bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and members of the ruling religious and ethnic groups — those, in other words, who had most invested in the status quo. ‘Out’ groups were typically made up of non-statist groups whose support (tacit or otherwise) was required in order to minimize the
concessions the regime was obliged to make in its search for worker passivity. By and large, these were middle-class progressives, women, regionalists and peasant representatives. ‘Excluded’ groups were mostly members of minority races, adherents to non-state religions, the urban proletariat and those most disadvantaged by the selective repression of the semi-authoritarian state. Generally speaking, their incorporation was not attempted.

Using the growth in communications technologies and the consequent narrowing of the distance between centre and periphery which industrialization produces, political elites offered limited representation to members of both ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. By colluding with industrial capital, semi-authoritarian states developed limited electoral democracies which permitted broadly non-compliant political parties to exist. Indeed, it is this incorporation of liberal and majority-religious sentiment, coupled with a fear of worker radicalism and minority irredentism frequently engendered by mass enfranchisement, that ensured the perpetuation of elite rule. Unable to forge extensive links with middle-class political consciousness, urban labour organization and minority ethnicity/religiosity remained (despite establishing varying forms of generally legal yet highly unsympathetic political organizations) disassociated from the centres of state power. This, combined with the effects of advances in domestic surveillance, ensured that anti-statist groups could not develop extensive, grassroots movements with sufficient organizational power to threaten the despotic authority and infrastructural capacity of the semi-authoritarian regime.

Such a combination of incorporative and exclusionary strategies was, Mann argues, grounded on three approaches. Firstly, in economic terms, semi-authoritarian regimes sought the support of bourgeois capital. In both domestic and geopolitical terms, property, industry and commerce tended to be overly favoured and incorporated into the state infrastructure. The international nature of capital organization also meant that state regimes seeking to incorporate economic elites frequently tended to be sensitive to external pressure. Therefore, agriculture was modernized, private investment was sponsored and sectoral and segmental divides within collective labour were widened both to fragment domestic opposition and to seek the approval of increasingly internationalized networks of bourgeoisie capital. Secondly, and in some ways contradictorily, semi-authoritarian regimes vigorously promoted statist ideologies. Notions of citizenship were bolstered by immanent forms of state-reinforcing nationalism. Discourses emerged which (sometimes violently) debarred religious, liberal and socialist internationalism through endogenous scapegoating and the fabrication of spurious extraneous threats. Thirdly, semi-authoritarian regimes disproportionately represented the concerns of the military. This was due to four factors: the ‘bourgeoisieification’ of officer corps as land forces grew during the nineteenth century, a shared interest in highly capital-intensive weapons industries and technologies, the importance of coercion in the pacification of labour and, finally, the potential threat that the military represented to
civilian, political elites. Senior staff officers were, therefore, always a part of the executive within systems of semi-authoritarian incorporation (Mann, 1993: 322–3).

Within autocratic-militarist systems, military elites enjoyed an even greater political role. These types of regime were marked by the uniform repression of all forms of dissent. Unlike semi-authoritarian states, where policing rarely escalated beyond the capacity of civilian constabularies, the maintenance of order within autocratic systems frequently relied on paramilitary formations and, occasionally, the deployment of regular forces. The former commonly involved localized militias from which the state elite could more easily distance itself. Such responsibilities were not palatable to military high commands, who tended to view domestic duties as beyond their training and remit, demeaning to units’ sense of battlefield honour and likely to pose a threat to command hierarchies as civilian causalities grew. Consequently, assembling these forces frequently necessitated some degree of civil mobilization, often through the sponsorship of centrally-affiliated peasant or labour organizations. These were administered directly by state agents with neither an institutionalized system of representation nor, despite some degree of covert mutualism, extensive bourgeois input.

The higher echelons of the state, rather than bourgeois capital, also ran the economy within autocratic regimes. Bureaucratically organized schemes typically involved authoritatively organized projects of huge capital value such as major transport infrastructures, military armaments and mineral extraction. Often, such enterprises contained significant ideological aspects. Power generation, railways and weaponry all reduced logistic obstacles to infrastructural penetration, thereby bringing the periphery closer to the despotism of the centre, both physically and culturally. Although such ‘modernism’ was often supported by bourgeois liberalism, the undifferentiated nature of the repression which accompanied it made moderate forms of civil resistance unlikely. Typically, cross-class alliances were formed which tended to view the state as a homogeneous entity with which negotiation was futile. However, autocratic regimes did not, in general, contain a cohesive oligarchy. Although recurrently favouring uniform force and hierarchic authority over the incorporation and partial subjugation of semi-authoritarian regimes, state elites were often acutely divided. Aware that coercion was an expensive and inefficient method of rule and that complete autocracy was impossible, they ‘vacillated between minimal reform and brutal repression, an internal struggle usually resolved in favour of military repression by an instinctive fear of autonomous powers arising in civil society’ (Mann, 1993: 661). The result of this was that policy was more likely to be determined by incremental ‘drift’ and that oppression was patchy, pragmatic and intermittent.

A key reason for the long-term ineffectiveness of autocratic rule is, for Mann, the duality of state power. Since political elites are able to impose their will on those they can reach most easily, the organization of state
authority is marked by a fundamental centre–periphery divide. As the state seeks to extend its infrastructural reach, this bifurcation is impressed upon the other networks of economic, ideological and military power. The more the state is reliant upon distributive systems of power application, the more apparent this divide becomes. In this sense, autocratic regimes are limited by the inherent organizational duality of military power. Using ‘the bluntest instrument of human power’ to control the everyday lives of the ruled ‘requires such a high level of coercion, logistical back-up and surplus extraction that it is only practical within close communications to the armed forces’ (Mann, 1986: 26; 1984: 200). The result is that coercion tends to remain effectual only in intensive pockets along logistical routes with little extensive penetration, limited infrastructural reach and minimal territorial control. In fact, deploying the ‘hard power’ of distributive military might tends to reduce the effectiveness of ‘softer’ attempts at collective persuasion (Nye, 2002). So coercion tends to produce ‘terrorised populations [who] will not normally step beyond certain niceties of compliance, but whose behaviour cannot be positively controlled’ (Mann, 1986: 26).

Ideological power networks are also split. They may be deployed by organized elites either transcendentally in order to limit the efficacy of existing power relations or as a means of normatively pacifying resistance. In other words, networks of ideological power may reduce the authority of economic, military and political power institutions by reinforcing/generating a ‘sacred’ form of authority or, conversely, they may serve to ‘intensify the cohesion, the confidence, and, therefore, the power of an already-established social group’ (Mann, 1986: 23–4). Economic power may similarly be used to challenge or to support the given relations of extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of natural resources. Here, the tensions between the imperatives of state extraction and the bourgeoisie’s tendency to prefer limited governmental infrastructures, reduced armaments budgets and lower levels of taxation and conscription are important. Since economic elites generally regard centrally organized and coercive political institutions as superfluous, the expansion of state infrastructures has tended to produce bifurcated structures consisting of a relatively non-coercive core and an expropriated periphery (Mann, 2000: 8). In the following sections, this dual model of state power will be used to analyse the regime that has emerged in Turkey since the 1980 coup.

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INCORPORATION AND AUTOCRACY

The institutional origins of Turkey’s dual regime lie in the civil disorder of the late 1970s. Reported casualties of 5,241 dead and 14,152 injured as right-wing extremists fought with socialist and Islamist groups in the streets of major cities during 1978 and 1979 led senior staff commanders to
conclude that ‘a disguised war was actually being waged in Turkey’ (Evren, 1990: 552). Although the causes of the violence may have been more to do with price index rises of over 20 per cent per annum, an annual inflation rate of 100 per cent (1979–80) and public sector cuts to meet the lending conditions of debts of over USS 14 billion (Hershlag, 1988: 79–80), the military high command laid the blame squarely upon the incumbent civilian administration. Of the perceived dangers to the state, leftists were regarded as the most threatening. Of these, those organizations with manifestos which explicitly challenged the integrity of the Turkish state (and, by extension, the raison d’être of the armed forces) were, as a 1979 report from the Head of the Gendarmerie Inspection Council outlines, singled out for particular consideration (Evren, 1990). This section will outline the ways in which the state has attempted to deal with this threat. In particular, it will look at the changes that occurred to the structure of the political regime in Turkey during the most intense period of violent conflict, 1984–2000.

Of the forty-nine identifiable ethnic groups which could, however improbably, constitute a basis for separatist activity in Turkey, the Kurds arguably represent the most viable (Andrews, 1989). While the boundaries that demarcate ‘Kurdishness’ in Turkey are, even after polarization by the violence of the civil war, far from clear, Kurdish identity is generally understood to refer to speakers of one of four inter-related languages — Kurmanji, Sorani, Zaza and Gurani (Kocher, 2002: 9). With no census data on mother-tongues since 1965, assessments of the numbers speaking these languages differ greatly: figures as far apart as 3 million and 20 million are not uncommon (İçduygu et al., 1999: 1001). The location of Kurds is similarly uncertain, with somewhere between 65 per cent and 90 per cent estimated to be living in the eastern or south-eastern regions. For this article, demographic data are derived from Servet Mutlu’s authoritative study which suggests that the overall Kurdish population comprises approximately 12.6 per cent of the population of Turkey, or just over 7 million people (Mutlu, 1996). Table 1 shows those provinces in which Mutlu estimates the Kurdish population to be in excess of 40 per cent, accounting for just over half the country’s entire Kurdish population.

These provinces have long been a source of peripheral disquiet and, since Ottoman times, the state has struggled to extend its political infrastructure into what remains an area of well-institutionalized cultural traditions and topologically difficult terrain. Rebellions have occurred in each stage of Turkey’s development. The most notable of these were led by Badr Khan in 1836 against Sultan Mahmud, Ubaiedullah in 1880 against Sultan Abdul-Hamid, and Sheikh Said in 1925 against Mustafa Kemal. Following the establishment of party politics in the 1940s, the representation of this region became increasingly important. During the 1960s, Kurdish-speaking delegates, enjoying considerable support from migrant groups within the poorer suburbs of Ankara and Istanbul, developed ties with broadly leftist organizations which, in the 1970s, gave rise to a number of direct action groups.
Foremost among these was the Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkareni Kurdistan, PKK). Although at the time of the 1980 coup the PKK was still relatively small, it had, according to the Interior Ministry, already murdered 238 people and constituted a sufficient threat to warrant the rounding up of 1,790 alleged members — over half the total number of prosecutions for ‘separatist activities’ (Gunter, 1990: 68; Türkmen, 2001: 21).

The suppression of separatist activity was accompanied in 1982 by a new constitution which, coupled with 628 additional pieces of legislation between 1980 and 1983, strengthened the executive by institutionalizing a greater role for senior military officers (Özbudun, 1991: 41). These new laws contained, in many ways, a blueprint for a liberal democracy. However, the inalienable rights to which they referred were severely restricted by catch-all allusions to national security and the ‘indivisible integrity’ (Article 14) of the state (Muller, 1996: 179). In practice, this meant that prosecutions could be pursued against those attempting to exercise their constitutional rights in ways which did not conform to the narrow monist view of the state. Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, for instance, prohibited any association or dissemination which might weaken ‘national sentiments’, while Article 26 of the constitution and Law 2932 combined to ensure that Turkish remained the country’s only legal language — using Kurdish verbally, in writing or even as a name, could be deemed to be in breach of Article 3 of the constitution which enshrined a ‘national culture’ (Gürbey, 1996: 10; Lombardi, 1997: 202). This new order ‘afforded virtually no legal means for some of the frustrated ethnic Kurdish minority to challenge their perceived oppression by the government’ (Button, 1995: 71). Despite some legal revisions in 1991 and 1995, terrorism continued to be equated with a broad

### Table 1. Population of the Thirteen Provinces with the Highest Population of Kurds in Turkey (1990 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population ('000s)</th>
<th>Number of Kurds ('000s)</th>
<th>Percentage of Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>483.8</td>
<td>211.4</td>
<td>43.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>437.1</td>
<td>307.9</td>
<td>70.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>250.9</td>
<td>192.3</td>
<td>76.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>266.6</td>
<td>170.7</td>
<td>64.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>1,060.2</td>
<td>771.6</td>
<td>72.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>498.2</td>
<td>215.0</td>
<td>43.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>176.4</td>
<td>157.8</td>
<td>89.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>769.9</td>
<td>576.2</td>
<td>74.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>364.5</td>
<td>246.6</td>
<td>67.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>771.2</td>
<td>368.9</td>
<td>47.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>554.5</td>
<td>436.9</td>
<td>78.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>133.1</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>55.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>568.0</td>
<td>401.6</td>
<td>70.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,335.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,131.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.85 (average)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Mutlu (1996: 526–7).*
range of activities including the undefined charge of ‘separatist propaganda’ (Ataman, 2002: 135). Jurisprudential control of this section of the statute also remained under the auspices of ‘state security courts’ made up of a combination of centrally-appointed military and civilian judges (Cizre, 2003: 219).

The 1982 constitution also restructured the executive role of the military elite. The National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), which was formed following the 1960 coup, was now bolstered by a new State Supervisory Council to work directly with the chief executive.¹ For a period of seven years, the coup’s leader, General Evren, was installed as President and given the right to veto constitutional amendments and appoint constitutional court judges (McFadden, 1985: 72–3). Apart from the military’s central role in state security, the high command also controlled military liaison officers in every ministry. This, coupled with its ‘ability to present a unified bloc let . . . it easily “convince” the less coherent civilian group’ within the MGK (Özcan, 2001: 18). In order to extend this influence from the executive to the legislature, the 1961 constitution was amended to abolish the senate and create a single house to which the MGK was not accountable. Furthermore, the military’s access to the Cabinet was enhanced under a stipulation which obliged ministers ‘to give priority consideration’ to matters put forward by the MGK (Hale, 1994: 258). Although ostensibly to be reserved for matters of national security, these were generally interpreted to include ‘almost all issues which fall under the responsibility of government’, thereby institutionalizing the MGK as the ‘highest non-elected decision-making body of the state’ — a fact demonstrated by its absorption, and subsequent censorship, of the Ministry of Justice’s Commission for Freedom of Thought in 1994 (Hikmet Özdemir quoted in Karabelias, 1999: 135; see also Gürbey, 1996: 13; Tursan, 1996: 228).²

While governance under the generals was initially a broadly uniform martial approach across the country, the thirteen provinces of Turkish Kurdistan were soon singled out as a particular threat to security. Two-thirds of the entire Turkish army remained stationed there following the coup in order to oversee the arrest of an estimated 81,000 Kurds and to administer a wholesale programme of Turkification (to be discussed shortly) (McDowall, 2000: 414). Their autocratic position in the region was consolidated when the temporary martial law structures, imposed during the chaos of 1978, were replaced by a more thoroughly institutionalized

¹. The MGK comprised the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs and National Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie, and the President as a neutral chair (Heper, 1990: 307).
². Since Kurdish attempts at self-realization have long been regarded as a threat to the ‘indivisible unity of the state’s people and territory’, the MGK also remained ‘the primary decision-maker in the Kurdish issue’ (Gürbey, 1996: 13).
structure of emergency rule (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) in the provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van in 1987. The provinces of Adıyaman, Batman, Bitlis, Muş and Şırnak were added later. Embarked upon under Article 119 and 122 of the constitution and strengthened by additional legislation in 1990, OHAL invested extraordinary dictatorial powers in provincial governors and in a regional ‘super-governor’. Decree 285 (1987), for instance, permitted the governor to evacuate and resettle civilian areas in the interests of the region’s security, while Decree 430 (1990) granted the office of the super-governor the power to exile people from the region without further recourse (Article 8), to detain suspects without charge for up to ten days (Article 3) and to prohibit publications deemed to be provocative from entering into, or being disseminated within, the region (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 134). As Philip Robins concludes, the main thrust of the OHAL legislation ‘was to increase the punitive effect of measures that could be applied to the region, and to restrict the flow of information by imposing increased restrictions on the media’ (Robins, 1993: 664–5).

In keeping with Mann’s model of autocratic militarism, the OHAL regime has also made extensive use of local paramilitaries mobilized through the state bureaucracy and its agents. OHAL provincial governors have, for example, utilized a 1985 statute (Law 3175) which allowed for the introduction of a system of ‘temporary village guards’ in areas of emergency or martial rule. This was initially implemented in Siirt and then extended across the OHAL region during the 1990s, proving to be a lucrative means of income for local feudatories. The generosity of these payments, coupled with the Turkish security forces’ use of ‘threats and forceful measures . . . if the population refuse to take part’, had, by March 2000, increased the number of village guards to over 65,000 with an additional 335,000 to 400,000 family members salaried by the state (Gürbey, 2000: 73; see Council of Europe 2001: para 141, no 24). Regular troop support for these units from the 220,000 soldiers barracked in the OHAL region (the Defence Ministry’s own figure for 1995) could be arranged by the head of the gendarmerie via the Chief-of-Staff without civilian input (Button, 1995: 76). In short, the OHAL region became increasingly ‘subjected to a different legal and administrative rule from the rest of the country’ (Hakan Yavuz, 2001: 13).

This massive deployment of coercive force and the blanket repression it institutionalized through the state bureaucracy had two primary effects. The first was, as Mann’s model predicts, the disabling of moderate forms of civil resistance. The undifferentiated nature of OHAL policy provoked ‘total’ reactions which tended to view the regime as monolithic and unyielding. It is unsurprising, then, that the PKK’s organizational response was to structure itself ‘as a would-be state, and as such, carr[y] out what it perceived as state prerogatives . . . [such as] the execution of “collaborators”, forced recruitment and taxation’ (Bozarslan, 2001: 51). The PKK’s internal structure also
reflected the military-command hierarchy of the Turkish regime with each claiming martyrdom for its casualties (Özdağ, 2003). PKK agents operated similar blanket systems of repression in which non-combatants were offered no neutral ground: every settlement was either PKK or village-guard protected, taxed and policed. When villages, or even (as in the case of Şırnak in 1993) large towns, were seen as potential collaborators with the regime, ‘loyal’ Kurds were asked to leave so that the area could be transformed into ‘a free military target’ (Ö zgür Gi dém, 24 June 1993). Public amenities became acutely polarized, with the region’s education system particularly beleaguered. In keeping with its overarching programme of Turkification, the state ensured that the region’s schools remained largely staffed by ethnically Turkish personnel. As a consequence, reports emerged which suggested that staff members ‘frequently only attend[ed] to Turkish speakers and apparently ignore[d] Kurdish speakers as unworthy of attention’ (Kurdish Human Rights Project, 1996: 9). In response, the PKK had, by 1995, murdered more than 150 teachers, forced the closure of 5,210 schools and burnt down a further 192 (Milliyet, 21 January 1995).

Secondly, and again in keeping with Mann’s account of autocratic militarism elsewhere, the OHAL regime’s extensive use of coercion tended to weaken its control over other organizational networks in the region. Military power’s inherently dual structure could only terrorize those it was able to reach directly and thus could not control the daily lives of OHAL inhabitants. As Philip Robins points out, this ‘not only result[ed] in an increase in ferocity by way of compensation’, but also led to an ‘absence of authority spring[ing] directly from the state’s inability to incorporate significant sections of the [region’s] population’ (Robins, 2000: 65–6). Consequently, in 1993, after almost ten years of violence, the then Chief-of-Staff, Doğan Güreş, acknowledged that an estimated one in ten of all Kurds remained active PKK sympathizers — a fact widely recognized following the creation of an autonomous Kurdish–Iraqi enclave in 1992 and the resultant strengthening of the PKK’s logistical echelons (Gürbey, 2000: 79). Thenceforth the military abandoned many of their mountain operations to the village guards, preferring instead ‘to unleash indiscriminate barrages of heavy weapons fire against the urban population’ with the consequence that their ‘control over rural Kurdistan . . . steadily declined’ (Human Rights Watch, 1995: 24; Kocher, 2002: 5).3 Unable to translate military power into political authority, the regime turned to the widespread population clearances provided for in the OHAL legislation of 1987. According to Ankara’s own figures, 3,216 settlements were emptied and

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3. Osman Öcalan, the brother of the PKK’s leader, explicitly admitted that the regime’s oppression of the southeast was one of the key determinants of PKK support. In 1993, he stated that, after the army had undertaken an indiscriminate and murderous assault on the town of Cizre, ‘half the town has been presented to us on a plate’ (Turkish Probe, 13 July 1993).
then destroyed, displacing 362,915 people. Hamit Bozarslan puts the figures at close to 9,000 settlements and nearly 3 million displaced (2001: 45).

In non-emergency Turkey, by contrast, a regime comparable with Mann’s model of semi-authoritarian incorporation became apparent following the 1980 coup. As part of a ‘delegative democracy’, numerous organizations competed in regular elections upon platforms frequently unsympathetic to the position of the military within the MGK, but their weak civil linkages ensured ‘the relative insulation of political parties from societal demands and pressures’ (Özbudun, 2000: 69). So although pro-Kurdish parties such as Halkın Emek Partisi (People’s Labour Party, HEP) became a prominent feature of Turkey’s political landscape during the civil war, their contact with grassroots organizations ‘was severely restricted . . . suffocat[ing] the development of a lively interaction between society and politics’ (Jung, 2002: 147). HEP was, for instance, subject to a series of public investigations. The first opened in 1991, only a year after its formation, and concluded by accusing HEP of ‘engaging in activities against the indivisible unity of the state’ (Cumhuriyet, 15 July 1993). The party was closed by the constitutional court shortly afterwards, only to re-open immediately in a more radical form under the name Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party, DEP). In response, parliament relieved seven of DEP’s deputies of their constitutional right to immunity from prosecution in 1993 and, through the constitutional court, sentenced them to jail terms of between three and fifteen years (Turkish Daily News, 28 April 1994).

However, in keeping with Mann’s characterization of semi-authoritarian incorporation, the regime also sought to appropriate elements of civil resistance. Despite considerable opposition to its repressive policies, the military elite was willing to co-operate closely with most mainstream parties — particularly the centre-right Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) and the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP). The leading figure in the former was the part-Kurdish economist Turgut Özal. Having resigned from General Evren’s junta in 1982, he led ANAP to an unexpected electoral victory over the military’s preferred candidate following the return to civilian rule a year later (Barkey, 1990: 184). Content with his programme of

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4. The regime’s dual structure was clearly illustrated by HEP’s peaceful nine-day march from Istanbul to Diyarbakır in 1990. Within non-OHAL Turkey, the authorities were content to monitor the procession’s progress. In Batman, however, security forces were deployed to break up the march violently and to arrest thirty HEP members (Watts, 1999: 638).

5. In keeping with the state’s intermittent authoritarian repression and attempts at incorporation, the party was permitted to re-form under the name Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democratic Party, HADEP) — a title which, along with enduring controversy and persecution, it retains today.

6. For instance, the Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi (Social-Democratic Party, SHP) published a strongly worded report in 1990 which called for a halt to the militarization of the OHAL region, some decentralization of state powers and a series of democratic reforms (Gürbey, 1996: 19).
neo-liberal economic adjustment (to be discussed shortly), the regime was willing to permit a number of broadly pro-Kurdish reforms without allowing them to penetrate the fabric of their rule. In the tradition of semi-authoritarian incorporation, Özal’s attempts to liberalize the constitution by buttressing anti-torture legislation (1987), recognizing the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (1990), relaxing the restrictions on spoken Kurdish languages (1991) and intermittently granting amnesty to Kurdish activists as part of a new structure of informal dialogue with the PKK, significantly altered neither the daily lives of those in the OHAL region nor the autonomy of the military elite. Indeed, ANAP’s Principles of Democratization (Özal, 1991; Özdeş, 1991), which promised to meet the human rights proscriptions of the Paris Charter, explicitly excluded the OHAL region where it was argued that such reforms would ‘have a negative impact on the anti-terror struggle of the security forces’ (Gençkaya, 2001: 15).

More recently, constitutional reforms resulting from Turkey’s candidacy for full European Union membership, announced in Helsinki in December 1999 and reaffirmed in December 2004, have been restricted by comparable operational limitations and partialities. While it is certainly true that within the eight major reform packages passed through parliament between October 2001 and May 2004 there is potential to reduce the marginalization of the south-east, it is also clear that, as yet, this has not occurred. Although the OHAL regime has been formally ended (a measure probably more closely connected to the arrest of the PKK’s leader in 1999 and a subsequent collapse in pro-Kurdish insurgency), the issue of improved cultural rights for the Kurds living there continues ‘to lie beyond the parameters of the [sic] normal political debate’ (Öniş, 2003a: 17). As Kirsty Hughes notes, ‘the introduction of Kurdish language education and broadcasting has [for example] been inhibited or prevented by extremely narrow implementing regulations’ (Hughes, 2004: 3). As a result, ‘how human rights are implemented changes from town to town’ with the thirteen Kurdish-majority provinces remaining the primary locus of state-led abuses (Yüksel Alataş quoted in Turkish Daily News, 4 November 2004). During 2003, for instance, Kurds attempting to return to their homes have been obstructed,

7. Indeed, one of the indictments against the DEP deputies prosecuted in the early 1990s was that, in asking for the stipulations of the Paris Charter to be implemented nationwide, they had ‘implicitly refer[red] to the principle of self-determination and . . . [therefore] aim[ed] at dividing the nation’ (The Law Group Delegation, 1994: 9–10).
8. For example, Human Rights Watch recorded 105 interventions in legal and ostensibly peaceful demonstrations from the security forces between November 2002 and July 2003. Thirty-one of these were undertaken violently, leading Rachel Denber, acting executive director of the organization’s Europe and Central Asia Division, to conclude that ‘when Turkish citizens attempt to gather publicly to voice their concerns and criticisms they frequently meet official restrictions and police brutality’ (Human Rights Watch, 2004).
intimidated and, in five cases, murdered by irregular security forces. They have also been obliged to relinquish their rights to compensation and have frequently found their land mined or occupied by village guards (Global IDP Project, 2004: 3).

Outside these provinces, the military elite also continues to enjoy considerable influence. It has retained a powerful voice within the executive, despite being obliged to accept the Justice Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister onto the MGK.² From this position it has, in political terms, maintained a concerted anti-EU stance in direct contrast to Prime Minister Erdoğan’s pro-European platform and has even gone so far as to suggest that the accession reforms represent a ‘neo-colonial force determined to divide Turkey’ (MGK Secretary General Tuncer Kılıç quoted in Eurasia Insight, 13 March 2002). In order to prosper from the potential economic benefits of closer ties with Europe within the areas of key capitalist value in the west of Turkey, however, the regime has actively sought to incorporate elements of the extreme right. The origins and implications of this dynamic, along with the considerable ideological changes that Turkey’s dual regime has undergone in the last twenty years, will make up the main focus of the next section.

**IDEOLOGY, ECONOMY, DUALITY**

So, while Turkey’s bifurcated regime has been relatively stable in political and military terms, considerable dynamism has been apparent within ideological and economic networks of social power. In terms of the former, the regime’s need to appropriate ideological support in areas of high capitalist value and to outflank the PKK’s appeal to the peasantry within the OHAL region has led to a growing tendency to incorporate political Islam, but in quite different ways. Outside the south-east, the state has attempted, as part of its self-reinforcing discourse on citizenship, to reduce Islam’s inherently transcendental elements in favour of a greater social pragmatism — the so-called ‘Turkish Islamism’ (Szyliowicz, 2000: 376). Özal (who was himself a high-ranking member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order and once stood for election in Izmir for an Islamist party) was permitted to attend Friday prayer with his ministers in a very public manner, to undertake the Haj, to place similarly religious colleagues in charge of the Education and Information Ministries and, in 1990, to announce a 237 per cent increase in the budget of the Religious Affairs Ministry (Ayata, 1996: 44–5). In keeping with the regime’s contradictory strategy of semi-authoritarian

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² Indeed, former Chief-of-Staff, Hüseyin Kıvrkoğlu, dismissed attempts to civilianize the MGK as inconsequential by stating, ‘if they want 100 civilians as members of the National Security Council, so be it’ (quoted in Dunér and Deverell, 2001: 3).
incorporation, however, organized religion was also meticulously monitored. In 1987, for instance, 3,000 people were arrested for ‘anti-secular’ activities and, in 1990, 813 officers and cadets were dismissed for ‘having ties with fundamentalist organisations’. The state also began to invigilate Friday sermons during this period (Ayata, 1993: 64; Brown, 1988: 241).

In this sense, the grassroots Islamist movement, of which Özal was a part, represented the classic ‘out’ group. In keeping with Mann’s semi-authoritarian model, the regime sought a form of highly controlled co-operation with, firstly, ANAP’s religious wing and then (following the rise of Mesut Yılmaz, a ‘convinced secularist’, to the helm of ANAP after Özal’s departure to the presidency and his subsequent death in 1993),¹⁰ Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) (Cornell, 1999: 213). This type of state tutelage does not, Mann suggests, generally offer the agent an opportunity to relocate from the political periphery to the centre. Here, Turkey was no exception. The military rulers were able to engineer a coalition between the RP and the DYP which, in a measure typical of semi-authoritarianism’s ‘negative integration’, increased their supervisory power over popular religiosity without being seen to act anti-ecumenically. This was because the DYP contained a number of retired security officials including Doğan Güreş (an ex-Chief-of-Staff), Mehmet Ağar (a former Chief-of-Police), Sedat Bucak (head of the Bucak clan which supplied the army with a significant amount of paramilitary support in the OHAL region), Necdet Menzir (previously in command of the Istanbul Police) and two past OHAL super-governors (Ünal Erkan and Hayri Kozakçıoğlu). However, once the RP achieved a degree of autonomy through their sweeping electoral successes in 1996, the regime acted swiftly to sever the party’s linkages with bourgeois politics by banning the party and creating two new supervisory organs ‘answerable only to the MGK’ — the Bati Çalışma Grubu (Western Study Group) and the Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi (Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Centre) — with the remit of monitoring Islamist activity (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 2002: 194, 196).

Within the OHAL region, the state’s changing attitude to the incorporation of Islam as an immanent ideology has taken on a different form. İmset reports that many of those deemed to advocate Islamist leanings too acute to be tolerable within the civil service of the centre during the 1980s were re-appointed to influential positions inside the south-east (İmset, 1992: 122). The purpose, he suggests, was to minimize interest in a series of murders of socialist and Kurdish nationalists during the early 1990s by so-called Hezbollah contra-guerrillas, tacitly supported by the regime. Indeed, a system of collusion between state security services and extreme

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¹⁰. As Gerassimos Karabelias notes, Özal’s sudden death ‘a few days before submitting a major proposal for “Kurdish reforms” to the NSC [MGK] raised a lot questions’ (1999: 148, note 61).
Muslim organizations was uncovered by a widely suppressed report from a commission of Turkish deputies in 1995. This asserts that these irregulars had received training and accommodation from the OHAL security services themselves (cited in Fernandes and Özdén, 2001: 11–12). Since then, more evidence of this type has emerged, not least following the arrest of a group of activists who have been blamed for the murder of seventeen prominent journalists and academics. By 2000, it was estimated that such units had murdered over 1000 people (Middle East Times, 23 April 2000) — a regular feature, as Mann reveals, of autocratic-militarist regimes. High commands’ distaste for civil pacification frequently leads to the institutionalized use of paramilitary proxies which, in turn, necessitates the deployment of some form of state-led mobilization. In Turkey the generals promoted Islam across the OHAL region as just such a measure, providing an important ‘means of de-politicising society with the aim of combating communist tendencies and undermining the growth of [minority] national awareness’ (Laizer, 1996: 101). Troops regularly distributed leaflets calling upon people to support the regime against the heretical Marxism of the PKK and emphasizing the universal, a-national exegesis of the Qur’an and sunnah (Yalçın-Heckmann, 1991: 116). In all, it was a strategy that helped both to curtail the emergence of a pro-Kurdish discourse and to weaken the electoral performance of HADEP’s various incarnations (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 101–8).

The restrained mobilization of Islamism in the OHAL region contrasted with a second organizational form of state-reinforcing ideological power — Turkish hyper-nationalism — which ultimately became one of the key motors of change in the OHAL administration (Cizre-Sakalloğlu, 1994). Prior to the 1980 intervention, the state had utilized the extreme right-wing sentiments, pseudo-Islamic discourse and violent activists of Lieutenant-Colonel’s Alparslan Türk ’e quasi-fascist Milliyet Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, MHP) as a nationwide means of tackling labour disquiet (Schick and Tonak, 1987: 369). Following the coup, however, MHP thugs were neutralized in most of Turkey, only to reappear as part of the paramilitary deployment within the OHAL region. There, as part of their stated intent to eliminate the vestiges of Kurdish cultural identity within Turkey, they have been

11. In the 1995 elections, for instance, the RP bettered HADEP’s vote in Adıyaman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Muş and Siirt (Duran, 1998: 127). Here, however, it must be noted that the primary limitation on the electoral success of pro-Kurdish parties within the OHAL region has been a sustained programme of violence and intimidation from the state authorities.

12. Türk ’e first came to prominence as a key figure in the 1960 coup. Initially promoted by the high command, his persistent ‘doctrine of civil war’ against a range of mostly racially-defined ‘enemies’ quickly became an embarrassment and he was dismissed. By the end of the 1960s, though, he had re-established himself at the helm of a sizeable quasi-fascist political movement which eventually became known as MHP (Bozarslan, 1996: 141).
associated with a wide range of human rights abuses, frequently flouting command hierarchies if their handlers ‘have proven less than willing to co-operate . . . in brutalizing the population’ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 148–9). By 1995, when their numbers (together with the special forces they were usually attached to) were estimated at between 22,000 and 23,000, their repression had reached such embarrassing levels that the MGK was forced to announce their withdrawal (Yeni Yüzyıl, 23 July 1995).

While lacking comparable levels of mobilization, Turkish ultra-nationalism was also a feature of non-emergency Turkey. A revival of the chauvinist Turkist discourse of the 1920s and 1930s emerged as, amid a considerable increase in state-sponsored ethnographic studies, the 1982 constitution ‘revitalised the Turkish Language and Turkish History institutes’ (Kirişçi, 1998: 242). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these promulgated the idea that the Kurds were simply another branch of Central Asian Turkomen (Izady, 1990: 35). In a blend of statist immanence and endogenous scapegoating typical of semi-authoritarian regimes more generally, an ‘official’ discourse emerged in which the existence of minority identities within Turkey was simultaneously denied and, self-contradictorily, cited as a primary threat to public order (Bürak Arıkan, 1998). In policy terms, this found expression in the establishment of a heavily state-controlled Higher Education Board (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu, YÖK) with the explicit remit of removing all claims to minority identity within the bourgeoisie, and the introduction of strict self-censorship laws aimed at creating an obsequious media lobby committed to promulgating notions of ‘internal enemies, traitors and collaborationists who are engaged in activities that might endanger our national unity’ (Yumul and Özkırmızı, 2000: 795).

More recently, the military elite has utilized nationalist sentiment to dilute or obstruct EU-imposed constitutional reforms promising greater minority rights for Kurds. Here, ‘one can immediately detect an exact correspondence between the basic perspectives of the MHP and the military-security establishment’ (Öniş, 2003a: 18). In this way, the ideology of extreme

13. Evidence of the state’s collusion with MHP activists appeared in the wake of the infamous Susurluk incident of November 1996 in which a car containing weaponry missing from police inventories crashed, killing Hüseyin Kocadağ (a former Istanbul deputy police chief) and Abdullah Catlı (a former leader of MHP’s youth wing wanted for the murder of seven labour leaders in 1978, as well as narcotics offences), and injuring Doğru Yol deputy Sedat Bucak. The subsequent discovery that Catlı was carrying an authentic firearms licence signed by then Istanbul Police Chief, Mehmet Ağar, was particularly damaging — although not sufficiently so to prevent Ağar from eventually becoming the leader of the DYP (Kurkcu, 1997).

14. Indeed, in economic terms, the MHP have also become a key ideological partner in imposing neo-liberal macro-reforms, particularly since the death of Türkiye in 1997 and a shift away from pro-peasant essentialism within the party. This is signified by their support for the IMF stabilization programme of December 2000 which imposed drastic public spending cuts, particularly upon the agricultural sector (Öniş, 2003b: 37).
Turkish nationalism, as embodied in the MHP, has served the fourfold purpose of further consolidating the autonomy of the military by extending its role in Turkish politics, increasing the immanence of the Islamists, resisting extraneous pressures for political reform and legitimizing regime policy in the south-east (Kaplan, 2002: 117–22).

Moreover, since the ‘MHP’s mixed Turkish–Islamic synthesis actually is only shared by those secular Kemalists who accept an authoritarian political system’, it also strengthened the linkages between the regime and its civil ‘in’ group (Hakan Yavuz, 2002: 211) — particularly within the economic elite, where it ‘became the main vehicle through which the state reshaped mod-ernity in line with the ideology of marketisation’ (Cizre-Sakalloğlu, 1996a: 245). Here, the military elite’s motives appear to have been limiting the exposure of their vast corporate interests — both in terms of the potential danger of domestic labour disorder and international capital’s investment nerves (Jacoby, 2003: 676–9). Indeed, as Mann notes, the internationalized nature of capital makes semi-authoritarian regimes generally sensitive to external pressures.

In Turkey, the scale of the generals’ corporate interests has made this particularly so. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Army Mutual Assistance Association (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK), which is directly controlled by staff command, has acquired vast economic interests in highly capital-intensive sectors of the economy such as the automotive industry (with Renault and Goodyear), aggregate extraction and processing, stock speculation (with Axa), military aircraft construction (with Lockheed) and weapons manufacture, making it one of the richest and most important economic concerns in Turkey and intimately intertwining the military elite’s prosperity with that of the country as a whole (New York Times, 14 January 2001). A consideration in the generals’ decision to intervene in 1980 was thus to return the parts of the country that were of key economic value to pseudo-civilian rule promptly and therefore maintain international confidence. This necessi-tated the retention of the economist Özal as Deputy Prime Minister and the thorough repression of labour resistance to his IMF-led neo-liberal reform package (Yeşilada, 1988: 349–50). Such a conflation of the military and economic elites’ interests has, as Ziya Öniş observes, acted as a significant limit to ‘the push for [political] reforms originating from the large-business community and its constituents’ (Öniş, 2003a: 21). It also accounts for the military’s present approach to EU accession — that of favouring greater marketization while resisting political reform.

The combination of ‘Turkish Islamism’ and fervent marketization pro-mulgated by the military elite initially proved attractive to both the religi-osity and the entrepreneurialism of the Anatolian middle-classes outside the OHAL region which make up an important incorporative element for the regime. During the 1990s, however, such a Thatcherite vision of an economy without redistribution became increasingly alienating, and this social group became home to a number of semi-religious co-operative firms broadly
unsympathetic to regime incorporation (Jacoby, 2004: 149–50). The biggest of these, The Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, MÜSİAD) was founded in 1990 and by 1998 had attracted over 3,000 corporate members, representing an annual revenue of US$ 2.79 billion (Narlı, 1999: 40–1; Oniş, 1997: 757–61). Indeed, it was this movement which, in many ways, underpinned both the RP’s rise to power and the party’s Just Order (Adil Düzen) approach to the economic development of the south-east (Erbakan, 1995: 1–7). Once in office in 1996, though, the party presented a much diluted version. In place of a political appraisal, there was a repeated emphasis on the economic dimension to the conflict. As Burhanettin Duran points out, ‘by drawing attention to the correlation between the decrease in economic indicators and the rise of terrorism in the region’, the RP assigned ‘a crucial role to state-supported investment . . . [thereby] sustaining statist economic policies’ (Duran, 1998: 120). It repeated the findings of earlier investigations, such as Doğu Ergil’s conclusion that ‘what lies at the basis of the Kurdish question is a lack of regional development’ (Ergil, 1995: 65), and was thus in keeping with the agricultural modernization of semi-authoritarianism and the state-led industrial investment of autocratic-militarism.

Indeed, in contrast to the neo-liberal promotion of private capital in the non-OHAL region during the 1980s, the eastern and south-eastern provinces remained dominated by the public sector. A survey conducted in 1988, for instance, found that 74 per cent of manufacturing workers in these two regions worked in state-owned companies. The approximate figure for the country as a whole was 28 per cent (Mutlu, 2001: 114). This has continued to be the case with government policy, driven by the autocratic militarism of the regime, firmly backing large-scale, bureaucratically-organized enterprise. Here, the backbone of the state’s investment in the south-east has been the much vaunted South East Anatolian Development Project (Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) which proposes to construct twenty-one dams and nineteen hydroelectric power stations, and to irrigate over 1.7 million acres over seven of the OHAL provinces, bringing the region closer to the infrastructural control of the centre. Estimated costs of over US$ 30 billion (almost the entire state’s annual budget) have doubled per capita public investment in these areas, offering successive governments a well-utilized public relations opportunity — particularly after the project’s initial success in meeting all its power generation targets (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 124).

Concurrently, though, it failed to secure 95 per cent of its irrigation objectives, suggesting that the need to assure electricity supplies to the

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15. Further penetration was facilitated by the murder (allegedly organized by Abdullah Çatlı) of a number of eminent pro-Kurdish investors including the sponsor of the newspaper Özgür Gündem, Behçet Cantürk, businessmen Savaş Buldan, Hacı Karay and Ömer Lütfü Topal and lawyers Yüksel Ekinci and Medet Serhat (Turkish Daily News, 1 November 2000).
corporate heart of the west of the country outweighs any expected trickle-down benefits and fuelling the accusation that the real cause of the region’s under-development is state extraction (Yeni Yüzyıl, 25 April 1996). Moreover, no land reforms have been planned to mitigate the highly disruptive effects of the flooding, leading to claims that a ‘few individuals with good party connections have succeeded in getting the state to allocate large tracts of land to them’ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 190). Indeed, compensation for the resultant loss of livelihoods has generally been paid to the landowners, rather than to the sharecroppers who produce the bulk of the region’s agricultural output, thereby significantly increasing the regime’s coercive authority in the region (White, 1998: 150–1). In addition, plans to move crop production away from wheat and into export-orientated commodities (to be processed in the west of Turkey) such as cotton and tomatoes, combined with talk of forming an Istanbul-based conglomerate of wealthy ‘philanthropists’ to ‘kick-start’ the south-eastern market, have all raised fears of growing expropriation and an ever-increasing economic role for western-Turkish political elites (Milliyet, 26 July 1996).

Whereas in the west of the country the state remains very much what Ayşe Buğra calls ‘the employer of the last resort’ within a context of neoliberal minimalism, the regime policy in the OHAL region is wedded to classic ideas of modernization in which a developmental state is required to bring the centre closer to the periphery (Buğra, 2003: 458). As Ümit Cizre points out, though, the rejection of such homogenizing linearity is precisely what the identity politics deployed by the pro-Kurdish movement is based upon (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996b: 12). There remains, however, little prospect of a decline in the generals’ position at the forefront of economic planning and reconstruction within the OHAL region. In 1998, for instance, the then Chief-of-Staff, İsmail Karadayı, suggested that senior soldiers could do a better job than civilians in this regard (Milliyet, 1 January 1998). The following year, his successor, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, recommended that such a notion could be institutionalized by creating a secretariat for addressing socio-economic development in the conflict-affected provinces (Milliyet, 21 February 2001). Predictably, then, the current blueprint for the area’s reconstruction programme, signed by Bülent Ecevit in May 2000, was devised by the MGK and has not been shared with the public (Hürriyet, 22 September 2000). Consequently, ‘a major part of the infrastructural restructuring in the former conflict region of Turkey has [already] been carried out under de facto supervision of the armed forces’ (Aydınlı, 2002: 218).

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that, in keeping with Mann’s model of autocratic militarism, ‘state elites, not capitalists ran the show’ within the economy of OHAL region (Mann, 1993: 661). State economic policy aimed to bring the OHAL
regime closer to the ideology of the centre. Large-scale, nationalizing projects were generally favoured. These tended to involve significant roles (and budget allocations) for the public sector and were used to impress upon the public, both domestically and internationally, the high levels of investment that Ankara was allocating to the conflict-affected provinces. Such a pattern is closely in keeping with Mann’s model of autocratic militarism in which attempts at extending state power tend to produce bifurcated economic power structures consisting of a relatively pacific core of key capitalist value and an unstable, expropriated core. The accompanying discourse was commonly one of state-led modernization, making it attractive to bourgeois liberalism concerned about the mobilizing potential of the region’s relative deprivation and sceptical of the market’s redistributive capacity. Here, Turkey was no exception. Resistance to state policy was portrayed as obscurant, foreign-inspired, heretically anti-Islamic and motivated by criminally acquisitive objectives. Little differentiation was made between opponents of Ankara’s rule, supporters of the armed struggle and operatives of the PKK. In conformity with Mann’s model, the result was that attempts at Kurdish self-realization became radicalized and increasingly homogenized. The recurrent use of indiscriminate oppression, both politically and militarily, made moderate civil responses difficult to organize. Otherwise sectionally and segmentally divided social groups were pushed towards ideologues promulgating ‘total’ solutions. Cross-class alliances emerged which tended to take on the structures of the state, thereby further embedding Turkey’s bifurcated regime structure.

Similarly, Ankara’s strategy of developing highly statist mobilization strategies to confront such dissent also served to institutionalize the OHAL region’s separation. In contradiction to its nationalist organization of ideological and economic power, the regime sought to militarize the region’s society on the basis of its peculiarly recalcitrant nature. As Mann’s model predicts, the military’s reluctance to take part in civil policing generated extensive proxy militias closely connected to the MHP’s chauvinist and racialized understandings of social identity. Together, these became the authoritative backbone of autocratic militarism and regime bifurcation. In keeping with Mann’s social power rubric, however, such coercive force could not provide a viable basis for elite rule. The logistical difficulties of securing the levels of infra-structural penetration necessary to govern through military power, coupled with a policy of coercion’s inherent imprecision and unpopularity, make the armed forces ‘a poor basis for providing order, for satisfying the claims of those outside the state, or for enhancing the morale of those inside’ (Mann, 1993: 661). Since this is well-recognized by autocratic militarist regimes, policy towards excluded groups tends to remain motivated by pragmatism rather than value maximization — a preference signified by the Turkish armed forces’ decision to withdraw from policing rural areas of the OHAL region in 1992.
The use of force in the rest of Turkey was undertaken within a different institutional context. Excluded groups were repressed, closely monitored and frequently harmed, yet their existence remained a necessary part of the semi-authoritarian regime structure which prevailed. Coercion was used to create an overall atmosphere of insecurity and menace, rather than as an attempt at the ‘total’ militarization of civil society. In keeping with Mann’s characterization of European methods of limited incorporation, fundamentally unsympathetic organizations were permitted to exist and, in the case of identifiable ‘out’ groups, allowed controlled access to the centre. The constitutional framework which moved non-OHAL Turkey out of martial law during the early 1980s thus included considerable civilian input. Özal’s Anavatan party and Erbakan’s Refah movement contained significant ‘out’ group elements. While neither succeeded in gaining unfettered admission to the political centre, their presence within the regime did, as Mann’s model holds, result in an empowerment of moderate civil response strategies, producing a general picture of worker and minority passivity fragmented by selective incorporation.

Each of the three approaches which Mann identifies as fundamental to the successful prolongation of semi-authoritarian regime strategies was apparent in Turkey. Firstly, Ankara’s policy preferences were closely associated with the needs of bourgeois capital. In contrast to the feudal sharecropping of the OHAL region, agricultural modernization of Western Anatolian farmland greatly enriched large-estate farmers with connections to urban markets. The pursuit of IMF-sponsored reforms to support huge increases in the military elite’s economic interests through OYAK, coupled with the careful repression of labour organization, also helped to incorporate bourgeois values, and material concerns, into the regime. Secondly, highly statist ideologies were vigorously promoted. These emphasized the unity of the Turkish state by demeaning religious, socialist or liberal notions of internationalism and utilizing domestic insecurity to highlight, or construct, indigenous and geo-political threats. The regime reduced ideological power’s transcendental aspect in favour of a greater pragmatism. The so-called ‘Turk–Islam’ synthesis incorporated organized religion’s universalism into a dynamic and immanent discourse delimited by the exigencies of the ‘indivisible unity of the Turkish state’. Thirdly, the military elite were disproportionately represented within the policy formation process. Within the MGK, the generals’ greater unity, recourse to the state’s repository of coercive force and increasingly close relationship with corporate industry, ensured that they consistently prevailed over their civilian colleagues and have, so far, been able to maintain their position despite a series of important constitutional reforms. Consequently, it is they who have retained primary responsibility for the construction, maintenance and adjustment of the bifurcated regime which has emerged in Turkey since the 1980 coup.
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The Political Regimes of Turkey


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