Europeanization processes in Turkey

IREU 438
Session 13
Europeanisation processes
Outline

1. Europeanization mechanisms
2. Does the EU still matter in Turkish domestic politics?
3. Case studies
   a) The transformative effects of the Instrument for Pre-Acession Assistance
   b) Migration management and modernisation
   c) Global learning processes

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Europeanization processes in Turkey

1. Europeanization mechanisms
Europeanization means:

• The implementation of EU standards/norms
  – Polity level: e.g. independance of judiciary
  – Politics level: e.g. state society relations
  – Policy level: adoption of EU laws (acquis)
  – Cognitive level: European Identity
Europeanization mechanism/EU driven

• External incentive model (Schimmelfennig):
  – Political reward in return for compliance
  – Compliance if benefits of membership are higher than adoption costs – strategic compliance
  – Adaption costs: electorate, veto players, economical costs

• Example:
  – Opening of accession talks as external incentive for political reforms which would not have occurred without EU pressure
Europeanization mechanism/EU driven

• Social learning model:
  – Convinced of the legitimacy of the EU demand
  – Identification with the EU community
  – Frequent contacts lead to persuasion/socialization

• Example:
  – Europeanized expert community developed in Turkish EU ministry due to regular exchange with European Commission
Europeanization mechanism/Domestic

• Lesson Drawing:
  – Policy shift explained by domestic needs, EU as a role model
  – policy shift triggered by changed policy paradigms or identities

• Example:
  – Domestic incentives to modernise/improve border management
  – Global Policy learning
Europeanization mechanism/Domestic

• Changed opportunity structure:
  – EU serves as an “external ally” (Tocci 2005: 81) for the domestic agenda of some actors
  – EU adds legitimacy to the position of these actors

• Example:
  – **AKP’s strategic interest**: EU commitment as a tool
    • to raise its legitimacy/gain votes
    • to achieve more religious freedom
External incentive mechanism works better ...

EU related factors
– if incentive is attractive (membership)
– if incentive is credible
– Short before reward is obtainable
– EU demands are coherently applied in the EU
– EU demands are clearly formulated
External incentive mechanism works better ...

Domestic context factors

– if misfit level is low
– state capacity is high
– interests of the ruling party/ies overlap with EU demands/lack of strong veto players
– if candidate country does not have promising alternatives
The socialization mechanism works better ...

– in the long run (development of an EU community inside the administration needs time)

– relationship in common projects is based on partnership

– high trust level (influenced by the political context)

– overlap of EU norms – norms promoted by other International organisation
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2. Does the EU still matter in Turkish domestic politics?
Recent developments in Turkey: Declining EU enthusiasm in Turkey

• Negative discourse of Turkey skeptics in Europe had a negative impact on public opinion in Turkey
  – 80 % supported EU accession after the opening of accession talks in 2005
  – Support rate below 50% since 2010
  – EU-skepticism has grown in the party system
Table 2. Main reason for declining EU Support

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘Ongoing opposition in the EU’</th>
<th>‘New economic and strategic opportunities of Turkey’</th>
<th>‘EU less important in the further consolidation of Turkey’s democracy’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AKP voters</strong></td>
<td>58 %</td>
<td>42 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHP voters</strong></td>
<td>68 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MHP voters</strong></td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics</strong></td>
<td>72 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students</strong></td>
<td>56 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business sector</strong></td>
<td>60 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>63 %</td>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
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Low public support makes it more difficult to push reforms

• **Political costs:** opposition frames EU demands as a sellout of national interests

• **Economical costs:** The lack of a clear path to membership makes harmonization to EU standards more difficult
  
  – Adoption of environmental law: €140bn
  
  – Opening of public procurement market – worth €60bn
Turkey’s new strategic options as regional power

• Proactive and multilateral foreign policy in Turkey’s wider neighborhood
  – Stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
  – Mediation between Washington and Teheran
  – Caucasus Security and Cooperation together with Russia

• Growing role as energy hub

• Nationalist discourse, new self-confidence, authoritarian trend
Turkey’s role as regional actor facilitated by its economic strength

• 17th largest economy, member of G20, average growth rate of 6% between 2002 and 2006, per capita income trippled
• Increased trade with East neighbours
• Ratio of trade with EU decreased from 55% (2003) to 41% (2008)
EU’s transformative power in Turkey is weaker than in Central/Eastern Europe

• Membership incentive is less credible
• Membership incentive is less important; Turkey has alternative strategic options
Why does the reform process (partially) continue?

• EU related factors
  – Normative entrapment/Agency of the European Commission
  – Alternative incentives: Monetary Aid, Knowhow, visa free travel

• Domestic Factors
  – Benefits of EU acquis harmomisation independent of EU membership
  – Agency of administration, however limited impact, does not include sensitive policies (e.g. freedom of press, Kurdish issue)
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3. Case Study: The transformative effects of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)
The EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)

• Supports reforms in the ‘candidate countries’ with financial and technical help
• Turkey receives almost 1bn Euro in 2013 for projects in the following categories:
  – Institution building
  – Cross border cooperation
  – Regional development
  – Rural development
  – Human resources
The fundings for Turkey focus on...

– Rule of law and key reforms of the judiciary, especially regarding fundamental rights.

– Adoption of EU law on transport, agriculture, food safety, environment, climate change, energy.

– Competitiveness and economic and social development.

– Civil society, gender equality, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

– Developing good relations with neighboring countries.
Twinning projects are part of the IPA-instrument

• Aim of twinning corresponds to the ‘social learning model’:
  – Ownership: Beneficiary country selects the member state delegation with which a project is executed
  – Time factor: Lasting up to two years and with the possibility of targeted follow-up, twinning helps building long-term relationships between old, new and future member states in a less politicised setting
Evidence from Twinning projects in CEE countries

• Mixed results regarding the success rate and the socialization effects in particular

• Reasons:
  – Strategic/selective learning
  – Frequent staff turnover
  – Mistrust/cultural differences
  – Vagueness of EU acquis
Mixed results for Twinning projects in Turkey, too

• 25 out 77 twinning projects related to Justice and Home Affairs between 2002-2007

• Evidence from interviews with involved actors:
  1. Strategic learning in the short run
  2. Social learning in the long run
  3. Important mediation function of the Ministry for EU Affairs
  4. Discretion of the European Commission
Twinning as an opportunity structure for organizational interests

• **Example**: Project between Turkish National Police and the German Federal Police

• For the Turkish project management
  – the aim of twinning to qualify for EU membership, or the broader context of the EU’s integrated border management approach (IBM), played almost no role at all.
  – Instead the Turkish project management was mainly interested in improving the standing of the TNP in the domestic debate about the composition and competences of the planned new border guard.
The long term socialization effects of Twinning projects

• Follow-up projects may create lasting networks
• In order to manage the IPA process, the Turkish ministries established EU departments, consisting of a growing body of staff with IPA financed training. This EU expert community facilitates intra-/interministerial exchange in EU-related matters.
• Recommendations of colleagues often more acceptable than those of the EU delegation
... illustrated by the preparation of the new asylum law (1)

• “National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration” was prepared during a twinning project

• Envisaged the establishment of a specialized institution for migration management

• First step towards its creation was the establishment of the Asylum and Migration Bureau in October 2008.
... illustrated by the preparation of the new asylum law (2)

• Asylum and Migration bureau received the mandate to prepare the draft law
• Indeed, the interior ministry has an organisational self-interest as the laws will increase its competences.
• However, the way the law was prepared illustrate a Europeanized style, such as
  – active civil society involvement
  – intensive communication with other ministries and parliamentarians
The asylum law, adopted in April 2013

• is the first legislative framework to protect the rights of immigrants and refugees by strengthening the institutional capacity in conformity with EU and international standards

• Establishes a new civilian body to oversee refugee applications, a process currently handled by the police.

• does not lift the geographical limitation with which Turkey joined the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The Ministry for EU Affairs as change agent

- Improved institutional capacity due to training and staff increase
- National Coordinator of IPA projects
- Europeanized actor/spokesperson of the Commission
- Promoter of intra/inter-ministerial dialogue, involvement of civil society
- Arbiter in inter-ministerial conflicts
Discretion of the European Commission in the IPA-process

• Final approval on setting the criteria for the distribution of funds
• Final approval of projects, thus Commission can exploit the competition for projects among ministries to ensure the inclusion of certain aspects, regardless of whether these are a priority for the applicant
Conclusion: IPA-induced administrative cultural change

- Involvement of NGO’s
- Involvement of the regional level
- Improved intra and inter-ministerial dialogue
- Development of an EU-phile expert community
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4. Case study: border management and the modernisation factor
The draft law on border management, drafted in November 2010

- fulfills key demands of the EU: once passed by the parliament, it will introduce a new border guard under civilian oversight of the Ministry of Interior, thus reducing the autonomy of the Armed Land Forces at border surveillance.
- The training of the new border guard has already started
The salience of a more effective border management

- 80% of new irregular immigrants in the EU come via Turkey
- 42% of irregular immigrants, apprehended by Turkish authorities, planned to stay in Turkey
- Number of asylum seekers increased by 74% in 2011 in comparison to 2010
- Improved border management/asylum system framed as part of Turkey’s modernisation strategy
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5. Influence of other international actors
The influence of non-EU actors

• UNHCR:
  – long standing partner in status determination and resettlement of recognized refugees
  – contributed to a shift from a national security perspective to human rights/international law

• ECTHR:
  – rulings condemning Turkey for violations
  – growing financial burden
  – Loss of international prestige
Conclusion (1)

• EU continues to play an important role in Turkey’s domestic politics
  – Membership still important motivation for reform
  – IPA funding: influence via conditional acceptance of projects and socialization processes
  – EU influence facilitated by partially overlapping interests (modernisation strategy of Turkey)
Conclusion (2)

• However, EU influence has two limitations:
  – Costly reforms such as the lifting of the geographical limitation, are used as bargaining tool and will probably not be realized without a more secure membership perspective
  – Weaker effect on the top executive